Introduction
Kant’s Goodwill
The opening sentence of Kant’s Grounding of Metaphysics of Morals boldly states, “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will.” (Kant, 1993, p. 7) This is to say that anything that one may think of as good could in itself also be considered bad, perhaps in its extreme form or intent, except a good will. It is not enough for a person to do what is right; they must do what is right because it is right. A good will can only ever be good, because its goodness lays in intent rather than consequences or results. (Kant, 1993, p. 7) A good will is, simply stated, the intention to do good because it is one’s duty to do so. This sounds relatively intuitive until one considers some of the implications of a good will being the only intrinsic, unconditional good and therefore the thing for which all people should strive.
In Kant’s view a good will is the foundation for the moral worth of any action. An act can fail to violate a moral duty and therefore be morally right without a good will, but it cannot have moral worth unless it is both morally right and done from a motive of moral duty, a good will. (McRae, 2014) This presents some problems when it comes to what a casual observer may see in another person’s actions. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to know another person’s motives. Someone looking on would not be able to physically see whether a person is acting from a sense of duty, personal gain or inclination. The act itself can appear identical from any motive. Kant, however, doesn’t care what a casual observer may see. He seems far more concerned with what one knows, or does not know, of one’s own motives. Admitting that people are self-interested to a fault, and not likely to act from a pure sense of duty even if they believe that is their only motive, he moves on to point out that “even if there never have been actions springing from such pure sources, the question at issue here is not whether this or that has happened but that reason of itself and independently of all experience commands what ought to happen.” (Kant, 1993, p. 20)
A good will, then, is the motive from which people ought to act whether or not the actually do so. Given that people rarely, if ever, act from a motive of pure duty this is an extremely pessimistic view that strongly implies that almost no human act is morally worthy. In the world today, I am inclined to believe that this is very likely the case. Ours is a world of deep and abiding self-interest that is rewarded and encouraged at nearly every level of human development. Socially we are encouraged to have concern for how we are seen. Economically we are taught to always acquire more of everything. Spiritually most of the world’s largest faiths teach that there is an ultimate goal, be it heaven or enlightenment or reincarnation. We are a species driven by desired outcomes. There are some possible exceptions in the actions of people like Gandhi, Mother Theresa, and the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. but there is no solid reason to believe that their actions were not out of concern for their respective afterlives, and/or the afterlives of others. Such concerns would not be in accordance with goodwill because they are ultimately driven by results, even if those results are not tangible or guaranteed. To act purely from a sense that the action is correct and morally right, and for absolutely no other reason, is an extremely rare motive indeed. It is possible for a person to do this only because we have the ability to reason and understand what right action is. (Kant, 1993, p. 8)
Williams’s Moral Luck
Because Kant’s concept of moral worthiness relies entirely on the human ability to reason, it rejects the possibility of luck entirely. From his perspective any human being could choose to do the right thing regardless of background or circumstance. Only the will to do good from a motive of duty could give an action moral value, or make it morally worthy. Williams disagrees with Kant’s idea that morality is not subject to luck and states that, “the dispositions of morality, however far back they are placed in the area of intention and motive, are as ‘conditioned’ as anything else.” (B. Williams, 1976, p. 116) He seems to think that it is ridiculous to believe that a person should be fundamentally concerned with moral value in considering his or her actions and that it is too much to ask for one to “grasp, not only morality’s immunity to luck, but one’s own partial immunity to luck through morality.” (B. Williams, 1976, p. 116)To illustrate his claim that morality is, in fact, conditioned by luck Williams employs the use of some less than ordinary situations. The first of these is that of an artist who chooses to suffer for the sake of his art. (B. Williams, 1976, p. 117) The manner in which this artist chooses to suffer is through his concern for the people in his life that he is neglecting to pursue his passion. Williams states that there is no way for his choice to be morally justified at the time his choice is made. On this point I believe Kant would agree. Williams, however, goes on to explain that if the artist were successful then he would be able to morally justify his choice in retrospect. This situation would be a case of moral luck because the unforeseeable outcome would give the choice moral value. (B. Williams, 1976, p. 119) He goes on to say that if the artist fails to become successful then, in retrospect, his choice would be morally wrong. (B. Williams, 1976, p. 120) His second example is that of the Tolstoy’s character Anna Karenina whose choices of note are to commit adultery and eventually suicide. (Editors, 2014) Again Williams’s focuses on outcomes and the idea that they could have been otherwise and perhaps even turned out well and ended without a literal train wreck. (B. Williams, 1976, p. 122) He then goes on to say that had she achieved the life she had intended her choices would have been morally justified. (B. Williams, 1976, p. 123) Had that been the case, her situation would also have been an example of moral luck.
For Williams’s third example he adds the concepts of moral regret and a state of mind he terms “agent-regret.” Moral regret is an idea he pulls from Kant and can be defined as a feeling of regret derived from the knowledge that one has knowingly acted against one’s moral duty. (Kant, 1993, p. 19) This idea of “agent-regret” adds a further aspect in that it may be derived from a person’s mere participation in a situation that had an unfortunate outcome. For one to feel “agent-regret” one need neither choose an action nor be directly responsible for an outcome. (B. Williams, 1976, p. 123) With these concepts firmly in place Williams introduces us to a truck driver who accidentally runs over a child. The situation is entirely circumstantial, and could likely not have been knowingly prevented. In this example Williams explains that any person who is aware of this terrible accident expects the driver to feel regret at his inability to prevent it, and have some desire to compensate the adults responsible for the child. (B. Williams, 1976, p. 124) The implication is that the driver would not be considered a moral person if he did not feel this regret, regardless of the fact that he was not, in fact, the cause of the child’s injury or death. It is luck only, though arguably bad luck, that places this driver in this unfortunate, morally charged situation.
Williams concludes by examining the implications of deliberative rationality in retrospect. (B. Williams, 1976, pp. 129-134) His argument for the existence of moral luck is centered on whether the results can be considered morally valuable in an intuitive, rather than purely rational, sense. He is concerned with “what one really wants the world to be like and what human dispositions are involved in its being like that.” (B. Williams, 1976, p. 134) Williams defines morality based on how people are rather than how they ought to be, and makes no distinction between morally right and morally worthy/valuable. On this point I think he fails to see what Kant was saying when he wrote, “I am willing to admit out of love for humanity that most of our actions are in accordance with duty; but if we look more closely at our planning and striving, we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always turning up, and upon which the intent of our actions is based rather than upon the strict command of duty (which would often require self-denial).” (Kant, 1993, p. 19)
Evaluation
David Enoch’s Moral Luck and the Law
The intent of Enoch’s paper is to prove that someone who acts with bad intentions is equally culpable whether or not his or her actions are successful. On this point I am sure that Kant would agree, and I am also inclined to agree. While Enoch’s paper is more specifically focused on how this claim should be interpreted concerning the practical application of the law, for the purposes of this paper I need only focus on his examination of the concept of moral luck described in the previous section.
Enoch begins by pointing out a “strong initial case for the denial of moral luck” with respect to how we generally apply or retract blame depending on whether or not one’s actions were within their control. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) I would not, for instance, blame someone for knocking a drink out of my hand at a crowded punk rock show unless it was quite obvious that he or she did so on purpose. On the other hand, as Enoch points out, there are intuitively persuasive forms of moral luck in which many people seem to find value and meaning. When the consequences of one’s actions, performed with negative intent, are not those that were intended one tends to be punished more lightly than if the intent had been carried through. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) Similarly, when one is never presented with the opportunity to act on one’s immoral predispositions he or she is generally presumed to be a morally upright person. (Enoch, 2010, p. 44) Finally he states, “We tend to judge people – indeed, to praise or blame them – for their morally relevant character traits.” These, of course, are a most usually product of environment and upbringing and are rarely, if ever, within one’s own control. (Enoch, 2010, p. 44) Being that these types of instances are all the sort which people commonly rely on aspects beyond an agent’s control by which to judge them either culpable or laudable, there seems also to be a strong, albeit intuitive, case for the existence of moral luck. (Enoch, 2010, p. 44)
There are multiple arguments from both of these seemingly basic points of view, but while the subject is a hotly debated one there has not been an irrefutable argument from either those for moral luck or those against it. (Enoch, 2010, pp. 44-47) Williams’s examples include each of the three types of moral luck that are described above, and Kant is known to have been a strong advocate of the “control factor” that Enoch describes. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) These are two of the original arguments of this type and all other following arguments would seem to stem from these two in some form or other. Those involved in the moral luck debate tend to hold their view as a part of their own core beliefs. This is why Enoch makes the point that “there is a nagging worry, that there is an upper bound to the strength of such arguments, simply because the moral luck debate is too close to moral bedrock.”
Enoch then goes on to employ his own example to illustrate the use of the moral luck concept in the legal system. This example is that of a murderer who either succeeds or fails in his task and is punished differently based on the outcome. The question, of course, is whether or not he is equally morally culpable in both cases. Kant would say that the choice to act, regardless of outcome, would be the deciding factor in whether this murder is morally blameworthy. Since murder is not in accordance with duty, and is certainly not done with a good will, it is a morally reprehensible act and therefore blameworthy. Williams, on the other hand, would likely say that the attempted murderer is less blameworthy than the successful murderer because he did not actually commit murder. Enoch posits that if we assume that moral responsibility is directly proportional to legal responsibility then the murderer, whether successful or not, would be subject to equal punishment, but he recognizes that this is not the only factor considered in sentencing. (Enoch, 2010, p. 49)
Enoch begins by pointing out a “strong initial case for the denial of moral luck” with respect to how we generally apply or retract blame depending on whether or not one’s actions were within their control. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) I would not, for instance, blame someone for knocking a drink out of my hand at a crowded punk rock show unless it was quite obvious that he or she did so on purpose. On the other hand, as Enoch points out, there are intuitively persuasive forms of moral luck in which many people seem to find value and meaning. When the consequences of one’s actions, performed with negative intent, are not those that were intended one tends to be punished more lightly than if the intent had been carried through. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) Similarly, when one is never presented with the opportunity to act on one’s immoral predispositions he or she is generally presumed to be a morally upright person. (Enoch, 2010, p. 44) Finally he states, “We tend to judge people – indeed, to praise or blame them – for their morally relevant character traits.” These, of course, are a most usually product of environment and upbringing and are rarely, if ever, within one’s own control. (Enoch, 2010, p. 44) Being that these types of instances are all the sort which people commonly rely on aspects beyond an agent’s control by which to judge them either culpable or laudable, there seems also to be a strong, albeit intuitive, case for the existence of moral luck. (Enoch, 2010, p. 44)
There are multiple arguments from both of these seemingly basic points of view, but while the subject is a hotly debated one there has not been an irrefutable argument from either those for moral luck or those against it. (Enoch, 2010, pp. 44-47) Williams’s examples include each of the three types of moral luck that are described above, and Kant is known to have been a strong advocate of the “control factor” that Enoch describes. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) These are two of the original arguments of this type and all other following arguments would seem to stem from these two in some form or other. Those involved in the moral luck debate tend to hold their view as a part of their own core beliefs. This is why Enoch makes the point that “there is a nagging worry, that there is an upper bound to the strength of such arguments, simply because the moral luck debate is too close to moral bedrock.”
Enoch then goes on to employ his own example to illustrate the use of the moral luck concept in the legal system. This example is that of a murderer who either succeeds or fails in his task and is punished differently based on the outcome. The question, of course, is whether or not he is equally morally culpable in both cases. Kant would say that the choice to act, regardless of outcome, would be the deciding factor in whether this murder is morally blameworthy. Since murder is not in accordance with duty, and is certainly not done with a good will, it is a morally reprehensible act and therefore blameworthy. Williams, on the other hand, would likely say that the attempted murderer is less blameworthy than the successful murderer because he did not actually commit murder. Enoch posits that if we assume that moral responsibility is directly proportional to legal responsibility then the murderer, whether successful or not, would be subject to equal punishment, but he recognizes that this is not the only factor considered in sentencing. (Enoch, 2010, p. 49)
Author’s Thoughts on Moral Luck
I don’t believe it is necessary, as Williams states, for someone to understand morality’s immunity to luck, or his or her own “partial immunity to luck through morality,” for a person to act from a motive of moral duty thereby doing what is morally right. (B. Williams, 1976) That most people are aware of their own free will and personal agency seems a truism that need not be stated. To assume that a person would need to be aware of the philosophical attributes or implications of morality (or how they may effect one’s own attributes) in order to exercise his or her freewill would seem to give all persons lacking a higher education a free pass on any morally objectionable choices. The statement that “they didn’t know any better” is only suitable for children and persons incapable of rational thought.
Two of Williams’s examples fall into the category of what Enoch calls “consequential moral luck.” (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) He seemed to think that how a given choice turns out is the factor by which it should be judged morally worthy or not. I strongly disagree with this view, as would Kant. There is no way in which to interpret Kant’s concept of moral worth that would encompass any statement of outcome. Regardless of whether the artist became successful or not, his decision to neglect his loved ones would be morally wrong because it neglects a moral duty. Anna Karenina’s choices were terrible because of their outcome, but they were morally wrong when she made them and would have been so even if she had gotten everything she wanted out of them.
In the case of the truck driver, which Enoch termed “circumstantial moral luck,” the feeling that is expected of him is not regret or remorse, but perhaps simple sadness or a strange kind of helplessness. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) When such things occur those who are aware of the circumstances are quick to tell the person driving that it is not his or her fault. The parents of this hypothetical child, out of anger and desperation, are likely to blame the driver but wrongly so. Those close to them would tell them, too, that it is not the fault of the driver, but was in fact an accident. Whether the driver feels regret, remorse or a baser sort of sadness is of no consequence because he is in no way morally responsible for the injury and/or death of the child. This case begins at the outcome and skips the choice entirely. If there is no motive or intent there is not moral responsibility, and common responses to such a circumstance support that claim.
Two of Williams’s examples fall into the category of what Enoch calls “consequential moral luck.” (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) He seemed to think that how a given choice turns out is the factor by which it should be judged morally worthy or not. I strongly disagree with this view, as would Kant. There is no way in which to interpret Kant’s concept of moral worth that would encompass any statement of outcome. Regardless of whether the artist became successful or not, his decision to neglect his loved ones would be morally wrong because it neglects a moral duty. Anna Karenina’s choices were terrible because of their outcome, but they were morally wrong when she made them and would have been so even if she had gotten everything she wanted out of them.
In the case of the truck driver, which Enoch termed “circumstantial moral luck,” the feeling that is expected of him is not regret or remorse, but perhaps simple sadness or a strange kind of helplessness. (Enoch, 2010, p. 43) When such things occur those who are aware of the circumstances are quick to tell the person driving that it is not his or her fault. The parents of this hypothetical child, out of anger and desperation, are likely to blame the driver but wrongly so. Those close to them would tell them, too, that it is not the fault of the driver, but was in fact an accident. Whether the driver feels regret, remorse or a baser sort of sadness is of no consequence because he is in no way morally responsible for the injury and/or death of the child. This case begins at the outcome and skips the choice entirely. If there is no motive or intent there is not moral responsibility, and common responses to such a circumstance support that claim.
Conclusion
It seems clear to me that moral agency is, as Kant and Enoch both believe, entirely immune to luck. A person cannot be held responsible for anything that is beyond his or her control nor can events beyond a person’s control free them from moral judgment upon their actions. Williams makes his arguments from a place of intuition and observation, but does not take into account Kant’s distinction between actions that are morally right and actions that are morally valuable or worthy. I believe that this is a particularly important distinction to make when considering any issues concerning rational deliberation. All of Williams’s examples were choices made “in accordance with duty” but not “from a motive of duty.” Without this distinction we are left with a concern only for what is morally right and we miss the importance of motive entirely. Having missed this point Williams disregards the ability all people possess to make a decision purely because it is morally right. His examples are all concerned with the personal desires of the agents involved and the regrets that follow and therefore none of them have moral worth in Kant’s view. In this way he fails to adequately argue against Kant’s conception of moral worth.
Bibliography
B. Williams,
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Editors, S. (2014). SparkNote on Anna Karenina.
Retrieved November 17, 2014 , from SparkNotes: www.sparknotes.com/lit/anna
Enoch, D. (2010). Moral Luck and the Law. Journal
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McRae, E. (2014, October 21,23,28,30). History of Ethics
Lecture. (E. McRae, Performer) University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.
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